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Abstract
Epistemic relativism comes in many forms, which have been much 
discussed in the last decade or so in analytic epistemology. My goal 
is to defend a version of epistemic relativism that sources the relativ-
ity in the metaphysics of epistemic properties and relations, most sa-
liently knowledge. I contrast it with other relativist theses. I argue that 
the sort of metaphysical relativism about knowledge I favor does not 
threaten the objectivity of the epistemological domain.
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In Stanley 2005 (henceforth KPI), I defend the view that knowledge 
is interest-relative. I also there defend the view that all important 
epistemic properties and relations are interest-relative. I was and am 
sympathetic to knowledge first epistemology. The interest-relativity 
of the epistemic domain is inherited from the dependence of all im-
portant epistemic properties and relations on knowledge. This is the 
distinctive version of epistemic relativism I endorse.
The view I defend is explicitly relativist. Relativist views are 
widely considered to be problematic. It is therefore important for 
me to distinguish it from relativist views that I also reject. Chapter 7 
of KPI distinguishes my view favorably from truth-relativism about 
knowledge, as defended in John MacFarlane’s work. Chapter 8 of 
KPI distinguishes my view favorably from Delia Graff Fara’s thor-
oughgoing interest-relativity about empirical properties, which un-
derlies her theory of vagueness. My purpose in this paper is to revisit 
1 Jason Stanley delivered the Disputatio Lecture 2015, titled “Skill”, at the 
6th National Meeting of the Portuguese Society for Analytic Philosophy in the 
University of the Azores in Ponta Delgada, on September 10th 2015.
Jason Stanley2
these issues, in the light of the more than dozen years of debate about 
relativism that have occurred, with the aim of providing a vigorous 
defense of epistemic relativism in my sense.
As in other domains, it has turned out that the evaluation of the 
weight of various objections depends upon one’s understanding of 
the conceptual tools of the theory of content. This point is familiar 
from the literature on truth-relativism. As John MacFarlane (2014) 
has made clear, the use of a framework that only involves contexts of 
use excludes the very statement of truth-relativism. We have become 
used to these revisions of the conceptual scheme for definitions of 
truth; they no longer appear so radical. My focus on this paper is 
elsewhere, however, on the debate between the limited relativism 
about the epistemic that I defend, and the more expansive metaphysi-
cal relativism that undergirds Fara’s theory of vagueness. Neither of 
these are forms of truth relativism. But here too, surprisingly, we 
find the same point; that arguments depend at least in part upon our 
understanding of the conceptual resources and tools in the theory of 
content.
Paul Boghossian (2008) sharply and usefully distinguished be-
tween semantic relativism, relativism about semantic notions such as 
truth, from factual relativism. This is an important distinction. Fac-
tual relativist positions pose a threat to objectivity claims. But there 
are differing kinds of factual relativism, even about the same domain 
(e.g., the epistemic). There are also different kinds of objectivity 
claims. In this paper, I defend my particular form of factual relativ-
ism. But the defense turns out to be subtle and complex, taking the 
form of distinguishing between it and many other forms of relativ-
ism, which I will argue do pose serious concerns to plausible ver-
sions of objectivity. We will need to wade through many semantic 
considerations to decide these issues, as well as epistemological and 
political ones. Such is the generality of objectivity and knowledge.
1 Objectivity and relativism
Boghossian (2008) distinguishes between what he calls “new age 
relativism” and a thesis that he calls “B relativism”, for “Boghossian 
Relativism”. The former is a semantic thesis, about the semantic prop-
erty of truth. The second he presents “not as a semantic thesis but 
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as a factual thesis”. John MacFarlane (2014) has defended a version 
of new age relativism about the relativity of epistemic propositions. 
Boghossian’s target in his work is however not primarily new age 
relativism. It is rather factual relativism about the epistemic domain.
Boghossian elegantly brings out the distinction between factual 
relativism and semantic relativism by considering two different for-
mulations of Einsteinean relativism about simultaneity. According to 
the first, it is a semantic thesis about the truth-predicate for proposi-
tions about simultaneity. According to the second, it is factual rela-
tivism about the nature of the relation of simultaneity. Boghossian 
points out, I find completely persuasively, that there is “decisive rea-
son” to interpret Einsteinean relativity as factual relativity, relativ-
ity in the metaphysical nature of simultaneity. After all, it would be 
strange to report to someone Einstein’s discovery as “good news! 
Simultaneity is absolute. But Einstein discovered that attributions of 
truth to propositions about simultaneity are relative to a frame of 
reference.”
The target of Boghossian 2006 is factual relativism about the epis-
temic domain. In fact, his target is narrower than that. It is a par-
ticular version of factual relativism about the epistemic domain. It is 
a version of factual relativism that makes facts about knowledge rela-
tive to epistemic systems. Boghossian rejects such versions of relativism. 
It is important not to confuse Boghossian’s aim with the implau-
sible view that the epistemic system with which we now operate cannot 
rationally be challenged. Boghossian’s position appears consistent 
with Kristie Dotson (2014)’s view that we may require a “third order 
change” in the domain of epistemology, a change in the tools and 
resources, in, that is, the epistemic system. Dotson’s arguments for 
this view are that we require a change precisely because we operate 
with an epistemic system that gets first-order facts about who knows 
what wrong. Boghossian agrees of course that there can be faulty 
epistemic systems that we falsely believe are correct. In forthcoming 
work, Dotson argues for a “third order change” in epistemology by 
explaining the sense in which our current epistemological scheme 
makes incorrect predictions about important cases. This presuppos-
es that there are epistemic facts of the matter, even as it leaves their 
shape not yet resolved.
I agree with Boghossian’s rejection of epistemological relativism 
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to epistemic systems. However, KPI argues for a version of factual 
relativism, of B-relativism as it were, about knowledge. So it’s im-
portant for me to distinguish the kind of B-relativism I reject, the 
one that Boghossian argues against, from the one I defend. Not all 
forms of factual relativism in epistemology involve relativity to epis-
temic systems.
According to the view I defend, knowledge is metaphysically 
more complex than we realize. But its additional metaphysical com-
plexity is not due to a dependence on epistemic systems. It is rather 
due to a dependence on practical interests. In KPI, this dependence 
on practical interests is taken to be a dependence on stakes. This is 
somewhat of an historical accident; the accepted judgments in the 
literature on “contextualism” in epistemology, found in the work of 
Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose, were at the center of epistemo-
logical discussion. These examples exhibit dependence on stakes. 
But ‘practical interests’ does not mean the same as ‘stakes’. One’s 
practical interests determine one’s stakes, but I am interested in the 
sense in which practical interests are intertwined with knowledge.
I take stakes to be a consequence of one’s interests, and the view 
of KPI is really that knowledge depends upon interests. I explicitly 
include moral interests among the scope of practical interests that 
affect knowledge; one example is an interest in not committing acts 
that contribute to injustice (Stanley 2015: 262). In Chapter 10 of 
Sarah Moss (forthcoming), she persuasively shows how this kind of 
interest dependence of knowledge helps to explain what she calls 
“The Problem of Profiling”:
Intuitively, when you hear a cardinal on that island, there is nothing 
wrong with believing on the basis of your statistical evidence that it is 
probably red, and there is nothing wrong with acting as if it is probably 
red. By contrast, imagine being in an office building and knowing that 
among the people that you see in the building, a majority of the women 
are secretaries. Intuitively, when you see a woman in that office build-
ing, is there something wrong with believing that she is probably a 
secretary?
Moss argues that there is something wrong, not just with acting 
on the belief that she is probably a secretary, but even with forming 
the belief; “what is wrong with your beliefs about the woman in the 
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office building is that for morally responsible subjects, those beliefs 
are epistemically deficient in virtue of failing to be knowledge.” Moss 
proposes a moral rule of forming beliefs, “the rule of consideration”, 
and shows that it entails that “knowledge is subject to a modest form 
of moral encroachment.” Moral interests are one kind of practical inter-
est; for this reason the moral features of a belief can make a differ-
ence to whether it constitutes knowledge. Knowledge depends upon 
practical interests, including moral interests. But this does not mean 
that knowledge is relative to epistemic systems.
Boghossian (2010) draws a distinction between a revolutionary 
factualist relativist theory, and a hermeneutical factualist relativist 
theory. The view in KPI, as well as the view Moss develops, are her-
meneutic factual relativist positions about knowledge. Boghossian is 
worried about factually relativist theses about normative domains, 
most centrally the epistemic domain. The worry that runs through-
out his work is that they are inconsistent with various versions of 
objectivity. I will argue that epistemological relativism in my sense is 
not in conflict with forms of objectivity worth preserving.2
Of course, epistemological relativism does threaten a position that 
some might think is a kind of objectivity. This is the view that epis-
temic facts are independent of interests. Jeremy Fantl and Matthew 
McGrath (2009: 28) have used the term ‘purity’ as an especially 
apt vocabulary for such views, which we will, following Fantl and 
McGrath, call epistemic purity theses.3 KPI begins with an attempted 
characterization of epistemic purity, setting it up as the target of the 
work. I will argue that epistemic purity is not a form of objectivity. 
It is an ideology, and not an ideal.
Rebecca Kukla (2015: 212) links the discussion of “the interest-
relativity of standards of evidence” in epistemology to the discussion 
2 Boghossian does clearly draws the sort of distinction that I am about to 
make, both in Boghossian 2006: 94 in a discussion about relativity to priors, 
and in Boghossian (ms.), between “thoroughgoing relativism about morality” and 
“absolutist relativism about morality”. Absolutist relativist moral truths are truths 
relative to circumstances. As he points out, the latter doctrine does not threaten 
the existence of absolute normative truths. Absolutist relativism about morality 
is metaphysically similar to interest relativism about knowledge.
3 Fantl and McGrath deny purism about knowledge, but accept it for other 
epistemic notions. This allows them to give a positive formulation of the thesis.
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in the philosophy of science. She sets pragmatic encroachment in 
the context of a literature in the philosophy of science dating at least 
back to the 1950s, and Richard Rudner’s 1953 paper, “The Scientist 
Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments”. She argues that it is a familiar 
point that scientific objectivity is not epistemically “pure”.
“[I]t is impossible to accept the once widely held view that scien-
tific inquiry is value-free, or even that value-freedom constitutes an 
ideal that it approximates”, according to Railton (1991); “theoretical 
practice must be regulated by the goals of an agent.” If science is to 
be objective, we must allow that objective inquiry is interest and 
value dependent. Objectivity should not be conflated with value and 
interest-independence, or situation independence. Helen Longino 
(1990) has also famously argued that interests resolve the under-
determination inherent in scientific inquiry. If scientific objectivity 
is not value free, why think that the epistemic domain is value free? 
Purity is a bias, not an ideal.
I follow Longino, Railton, and others in holding that epistemic 
objectivity is not only not threatened by dependence on interests, 
but rescued by it. However, there are several different kinds of ob-
jectivity that an account of epistemic facts must not undermine. My 
goal here, as elsewhere, is to show that epistemic relativism does not 
threaten any of these senses of objectivity. It is only then that it will 
be possible to conclude that epistemic purity is not important to the 
project of preserving objectivity.
One objectivity thesis I am committed to is some doctrine of 
shared content. One’s account of content should not erect large barri-
ers to having mental states with the same contents. Another objec-
tivity thesis to which I am devoted is the mind-independence of or-
dinary propositions about the empirical world. This is metaphysical 
objectivity; propositions about ordinary physical things do not gen-
erally depend upon interests and persons. I have defended my view 
by repeatedly contrasting it with a view that I do take to threaten 
these forms of objectivity. This is the ambitious version of factual 
relativism developed by Delia Graff Fara in her theory of vagueness. 
I now turn to explaining her view, and her defense. I conclude the 
paper by explaining that my version of epistemic relativism poses no 
similar threats to these senses of objectivity.
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2 Relativism generalized
According to Fara (2000), squarely facing up to the problem of 
vagueness forces us to accept pervasive metaphysical relativity on 
interests. Let me explain how Fara is led to this conclusion by her 
account of the Sorites Paradox.
Sorites Paradox
(a) Fa
(b) ∀x ∀y ((Fx ∧ Rxy) → Fy)
(c) ∃b1…bn (Rab1 ∧ Rb1b2 ∧ Rb2b3…Rbnz)
(d) ~Fz
Fara (2000) usefully distinguishes three different questions that 
someone who denies the Sorites premise (b) must answer:
(1) The Semantic Question
If the universal generalization in (b) is false, what is to be said 
of its classical equivalent, the “sharp boundaries” claim that ∃x ∃y (Fx ∧ Rxy ∧ ~Fy) ?
(2) The Epistemological Question
If the universal generalization is false, why are we unable to 
identify its false instances?
(3) The Psychological Question
Why are we so inclined to believe the Sorites premise, if it 
is false?
She points out that Kit Fine’s supervaluational semantics is meant 
to answer (1). Timothy Williamson’s theory of vagueness is meant to 
answer (2). Her main focus however is on theories that are designed 
to address, or motivated principally, by (3). These are contextualist 
theories of vagueness, such as Hans Kamp’s (which raise considerably 
more semantic and logical complexities than contextualist theories 
in epistemology). Her aim is to provide a theory that responds to the 
psychological question, but is not contextualist in character.
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My favored version of factual relativism is about knowledge, and 
not properties susceptible to a Sorites series. But there is a similar 
structure to the response space of the sorites paradox and skepti-
cism. In the case of vagueness, contextualism is used to explain why 
we accept the Sorites premise, which states that F-ness is hereditary 
in the R series. In epistemology, contextualism is used to explain 
why we accept single-premise epistemic closure, which is the prin-
ciple that knowledge is hereditary under the relation of known en-
tailment. And of course both domains involve judgments that seem 
to shift in response to facts that prima facie are irrelevant (some-
one can, at least apparently, move from being tall to not being tall 
without changing height). Fara’s aim is to develop an alternative to 
contextualism; an account that answers the psychological question 
and explains the shifty nature of our judgments, without placing the 
explanation on the context-sensitivity of vague expressions.
It is possible that the predicate [“tall”] could express the same prop-
erty from occasion to occasion, and the reason that the extension may 
change as the heights of things do not change is that the property ex-
pressed context-invariantly by ‘tall’ is a property which is such that 
whether a thing has it depends not only on heights, but on other things 
as well. I will go on to propose that despite the constant shifting stan-
dard of use for vague predicates…there is much less context-depen-
dence than one might have initially thought (Fara 2000: 64)
‘John is tall’ gets analyzed as ‘John has significantly more height 
than is typical’.
Whether or not something is significant is a judgment made rela-
tive to a person or persons at a time, based on their interests. The 
word ‘significantly’ has what Fara calls an interest-relative metaphysics. 
On Fara’s view, the proposition that John is tall contains a constituent 
that does the work of “significantly more”, and so is interest-relative. 
This mitigates the pressure towards postulating context-sensitivity 
in vague language, because that work can be taken up by shifting 
standards that affect the extension of the properties expressed by 
vague predicates. She argues that it is interests which underlies shift-
ing standards. Vague predicates express interest-dependent proper-
ties, in the sense that the extension of those properties at a world and 
time depends upon human interests.
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3 Objectivity redux
In Stanley 2003, I argued that Fara’s view poses a threat to two forms 
of objectivity. The first form is epistemic; if Fara is right, we rarely 
are thinking about the same empirical propositions. The second is 
metaphysical; her view entails a thoroughgoing metaphysical depen-
dence on interests that is threatening to the view that empirical facts 
do not depend on interests.
Fara’s ambitious view has startling consequences. But it did not 
seem much of a stretch to apply her ideas to the case of knowledge. 
While I thought it was too much to say that the property of being 
a mountain was dependent on interests, the view that knowledge 
depends on interests has at least a familiar pragmatist heritage in the 
domain of epistemology.
I have two basic objections to Fara’s theory, one epistemic and 
the other metaphysical. I will say briefly why I thought neither argu-
ment is a problem for an interest-relative view of knowledge, and 
also (briefly) why I was at least partially wrong (there are analo-
gous concerns about the modal profile of interest-relative epistemic 
contents, as Michael Blome-Tillman has nicely brought out). I then 
turn to Fara’s (2008) response, “Profiling Interest-Relativity”, which 
helps us think through the modal profile issues raised by an interest-
relative view of a domain.
I’m going to reiterate the points in Stanley 2003 here. The first 
point is ground clearing. By itself, it is not an objection. But it sets 
up the other objections. The point is that in the case of vagueness, 
Fara does not in fact succeed in eliminating the need for context-
dependence. Vague predicates are still context-dependent:
It is instructive to see why Graff needs to relativize the relation ex-
pressed by ‘significantly greater than’ to persons. If she did not, then 
the proposition expressed by ‘that mountain is tall for a mountain’ 
would be that that mountain is significantly greater than the typical 
height of mountains. But then no truth value for this proposition would 
be determined given a time and world. For a time and a world pair is 
too large to determine what is significant. Relative to this universe now, 
there are simply too many conversations occurring to fix on a unique 
set of interests. So Graff’s theory is not an entirely interest-relative ac-
count. There is still some context-sensitivity associated with a vague 
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expression. But once one fixes upon a person or persons whose inter-
ests are at stake, subsequent uses of the vague expression all express 
the same property (significant for that person). (Stanley 2005: 171-2)
This point is not intended as a serious objection to Fara’s view, nor 
is it one. Fara is committed to answering the psychological problem 
with interest-sensitivity rather than contextualism. And the typical 
sorites series occurs with a single person, over time. On her account, 
it remains interest-sensitivity that is doing the work of answering the 
psychological question, and not contextualism.
However, once one recognizes that sentences containing vague 
predicates, on Fara’s account, need to be contextually supplemented 
by reference to persons (whose interests are at issue), two concerns 
arise about Fara’s account, one epistemic and the other metaphysi-
cal. A larger literature has arisen about the first point, but it is of less 
importance for our purposes in this paper. I will nevertheless explain 
a few of the moves in the dialectic surrounding it.
The epistemic worry about Fara’s account is that it seems to entail 
that sentences containing vague expressions (that is, virtually every 
sentence) uniformly express propositions about particular people. 
So, an utterance of ‘that is a heap’ expresses a proposition about a 
person, whose interests at the time help determine the extension 
of ‘heap’. But then one cannot understand an utterance of a sen-
tence containing a vague expression unless one is acquainted with 
the person about whose interests it is. And it seems clear that one can 
understand an utterance of ‘that pile is a heap’ without having any 
sense of whose interests are at stake. This is a manifestation of the 
epistemic concern I have with Fara’s account.
The second objection involves the modal profiles of propositions 
containing interest-relative properties. According to Fara’s interest-
relative account, most propositions are about specific people and 
their interests. It seems to follow that these propositions would not 
exist, if those people and their interests failed to exist. And yet the 
proposition expressed by (1) does not seem to possess this kind of 
modal fragility, this kind of dependence on the existence of persons 
or their interests:
(1) This pile is a heap.
One would want to say that even if no persons existed, this pile 
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would still be a heap. And yet it’s unclear how Fara’s theory can 
license such a robustly realist conclusion. Fara’s theory suggests that 
virtually any proposition we would be interested in communicating 
depends for its existence on persons or least their interests.
Even if we restrict attention just to gradable adjectives, there are 
concerns with Fara’s predications. Suppose, pointing at Mount Ever-
est, I utter (2) and (3):
(2) This mountain is tall.
(3) If no one had existed, this mountain would have been equally tall.
But if x and y are equally tall, then if x is tall, then y is tall. So:
(4) If no one had existed, this mountain would still have been tall.
And (4) is a counterfactual that is false according to Fara’s theory.
Returning to the case of knowledge, it seemed to me that an in-
terest-relative theory of the knowledge relation inherits the virtues 
of Fara’s theory, but without its costs. The interest-relativist about 
knowledge holds that the propositions expressed by knowledge as-
criptions depend for their truth on the interests and practical situ-
ation of the knower, in just the same way that Fara argues that the 
propositions expressed by sentences containing vague terms depend 
for their truth on the interests and practical situation of the salient 
person. It is surprising to discover that the truth of knowledge claims 
depend on all sorts of practical factors about a subject in a situation; 
and this sense of surprise must be explained. But it is surely consid-
erably more alarming to discover that virtually all the propositions 
we grasp depend for their truth and even their existence on human 
interests.
There is no parallel epistemic objection to interest-relativism 
about knowledge. In the case of propositions about knowledge, there 
is clearly a subject whose interests are the relevant ones, namely the 
putative knower. A parallel epistemic objection cannot be raised 
against interest-relativism about knowledge, because knowledge as-
criptions impute knowledge to a subject, and grasping the proposi-
tions expressed by them requires acquaintance with these subjects, 
who are the very same subjects whose interests affect the truth or 
falsity of these propositions. So no worry arises.
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Interest relativism about knowledge on the face of it may not seem 
to have an analogous modal profile problem. It is clear, for example, 
that the truth-value of knowledge ascriptions does depend on the 
existence of knowers. However, there are in fact concerns about the 
modal profile of interest-relativist relative propositions about knowl-
edge. Indeed, these concerns are “[t]he most obvious problem with 
IRI” (Stanley 2005: 106).4 However, analogous problems are hard 
to avoid. Contextualism about knowledge ascriptions faces similar 
problems (2005: 107ff). And Michael Montminy (2009) has persua-
sively argued that semantic relativism about knowledge, the assess-
ment sensitive approach advanced powerfully in MacFarlane (2014), 
also faces precisely analogous difficulties.
Famously, Schiffer (1996: 325-8) argues that ‘know’ does not 
behave as an indexical verb (or like the place parameter in ‘it’s rain-
ing’). Schiffer points out that we do not tend to be confused about 
the fact that ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘today’ are indexicals. We are not 
confused about the fact that the extension of ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, and 
‘today’ and other indexical words changes with context. So if con-
textualism about knowledge were right, we shouldn’t be confused 
about the indexicality of the verb ‘knows’.5 In Chapter 3 of KPI, 
I add to these arguments of Schiffer; that if knowledge ascriptions 
are context-sensitive, they are not context-sensitive in a way that is 
analogous to non-controversial cases of linguistic context-sensitivity. 
Hawthorne (2004) and Cappelen and Lepore (2005) expand on the 
range of arguments that offer disanalogies between indexical expres-
sions and the verb ‘know’.
In Chapters 2 and 3 of KPI, I expand this class of arguments against 
contextualism to a wide variety of expressions that are widely re-
garded as context-dependent, and argue that knowledge ascriptions 
are not context-sensitive in any of these senses. I argue, following the 
aforementioned authors, that the knowledge verb ‘know’ is certainly 
4 The first time I presented a full-throated defense of interest-relative invari-
antism about knowledge was in Canberra in 2003. The first person to ask a ques-
tion was Sarah-Jane Leslie, who wanted to know what I thought of the modal 
profile objections to the view.
5 Similar arguments against contextualism about knowledge are expanded 
upon in Cappelen and Lepore 2005.
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not an indexical expression. I argue in Chapter 4 that context-sen-
sitivity cannot simply be claimed “on the cheap”. The moral of my 
discussion in these chapters is that the onus is on the contextualist 
to provide some plausible linguistic model of the context-sensitivity, 
given that the most obvious implementation, to treat ‘know’ itself as 
an indexical, is the least plausible, leading to the most drastic error 
theory.
In Chapter 6 of KPI, in my discussion of the modal objection to 
interest-relativity, I took the most plausible linguistic implementa-
tion of contextualism to be one that treats the knowledge verb as 
a modal of some kind (a treatment which results from treating at-
titude verbs as quantifiers over possibilities). I argued that this lin-
guistic implementation would face analogous modal profile problems 
as interest-relativism about knowledge. In response, Blome-Tillman 
(2009: section 3) argues that we should then treat ‘know’ straight-
forwardly as an indexical verb, and thereby solve these modal profile 
worries. This is to treat this worry for contextualism about knowl-
edge ascriptions in complete isolation from other worries, which 
raise even more substantial problems than modal profile worries for 
the indexical verb treatment of ‘know’.6
MacFarlane (2014: 186) concurs with Blome-Tillman’s curt dis-
missal of modal profile objections to contextualism about knowledge 
ascriptions. He is wrong to do so. The model of contextualism about 
knowledge ascriptions that treats the verb ‘know’ as an indexical 
in the sense of David Kaplan is considerably more implausible than 
other models. MacFarlane also defends assessment sensitivity against 
Montminy’s charge in Montminy (2009) that it too faces analogous 
6 This is not to say that contextualism about knowledge ascriptions has been 
refuted. Schaffer and Szabo (2014) agree that the verb ‘know’ is not to be treated 
on the model of indexicals, gradable adjectives, or quantificational determiners. 
And they agree that the most promising model for contextualism about knowl-
edge ascriptions treats the knowledge verb as a kind of quantificational expres-
sion, an adverbial quantifier. And they defend this against a range of objections, 
including the modal profile objection, arguing that adverbial quantifiers allow for 
“domain coordination” (2014: 530ff). This is not a facile dismissal of the modal 
profile objection to contextualism about knowledge ascriptions. Schaffer and 
Szabo 2014 shows that contextualism about knowledge ascriptions is very much 
a live proposal.
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objections. In response, I have argued (Stanley 2016) that Mont-
miny is after all right that assessment sensitivity about knowledge 
faces precisely analogous concerns to the modal profile objections to 
interest-relativism about knowledge. All of these accounts face the 
same difficulty.
Nevertheless, I agree with critics of interest-relativity that there 
has yet to be a satisfactory account by the interest-relativist (or any-
one else with an account of “shifty” intuitions about knowledge 
ascriptions) of why we make these modal errors. Here is a way of 
bringing the concern out, which I owe to Paul Boghossian (p.c.). 
We think of domains such as humor as involving facts that depend 
on cultural features of populations; what is funny depends on the 
projects, interests, and purposes of a group. But for this very reason 
we don’t think of humor as fully objective. If I am right, the differ-
ence between the epistemic domain and the domain of humor may 
seem to be one of degree, and not of kind. We clearly are resistant to 
thinking of the epistemic domain as involving interests. My previous 
attempts to explain this resistance have been unsatisfactory. Why, if 
knowledge is “impure”, does it seem pure? I turn to a new answer to 
this problematic question in the final section of the paper.
4 Masking interests
Fara (2008) addresses the epistemic and metaphysical objections in 
detail. She responds to the epistemic objection by denying that, on 
her view, a sentence like ‘Mount Everest is tall’ expresses a singular 
proposition about a contextually salient person (or their interests). 
The reason she gives is that the particular semantic analysis of grad-
able adjectives such as ‘tall’ or ‘large’ that she offers does not entail 
that the contextually salient person (or interests) is a constituent of 
the structured proposition expressed by sentences containing them. 
Rather, her analysis of gradable adjectives involves the postulation 
of an unpronounced positive morpheme in the syntax. This element 
denotes, relative to a context, what she calls a ‘high-type function’. 
The view is still interest-relative, because which high-type operator 
it denotes is a function of the contextually salient person, or their 
goals and interests. As she writes:
15Is Epistemology Tainted?
So what type of function or property must the positive morpheme be 
in order to achieve the [postulated semantic interpretation]? Given the 
order of composition dictated by the syntactic structure (SS) it will 
be a high-type function having measure functions for its domain and 
functions from comparison classes to properties of individuals for its 
range. On my interest-relative theory, it is a function f such that f(G))
(C) is a property that is true of a thing x just in case G(x), x’s amount of 
G-ness, is significantly (to a) greater than the typical (“norm”) amount 
of G-ness for a C. Which function precisely this is will depend on which 
of the various norms, and what agent a, is operative in the context.
When Stanley says (2003: 278) that according to this view the posi-
tive morpheme denotes the significantly-greater-than relation which re-
quires as an implicit argument an agent with interests, and that the 
view therefore requires there to be interested agents as constituents of 
propositions expressed using gradable-adjective predications, he gloss-
es over the pertinent aspect of my view. The positive morpheme does 
not denote a relational expression, but rather the high-type function 
just described. (Fara 2008: 331-2)
Fara’s response is that her view does not entail that grasp of the 
proposition expressed by a sentence containing a vague term requires 
acquaintance with a contextually salient person or their interests. 
First, a possible worlds account of propositions, she argues, is too 
coarse grained to use to characterize a notions like a de re proposi-
tion. Secondly, she argues that the structured Russellian proposition 
expressed by a sentence containing a vague gradable adjective, on 
her account, also does not require acquaintance with a contextually 
salient person or their interests. The reason is that the contextually 
salient person (the “agent...operative in the context”) determines 
the semantic value of a context-sensitive unpronounced morpheme 
in the syntax. But, relative to a context, the morpheme contributes 
only a high-type function to the proposition expressed, and not also 
an individual or their interests. And on the Russellian account of 
propositions, grammatical categories correspond neatly to epistemic 
ones. On this theory, expressions in grammatical categories associ-
ated with high-type semantic values are not associated with demand-
ing epistemic requirements.
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5 Interests unmasked?
Possible worlds accounts of content are not too coarse grained to al-
low a characterization of a de re proposition. Stalnaker (1999: 163ff) 
argues that on his account propositions do not come with a “strong 
acquaintance relation” towards particular objects. Nevertheless, he 
argues that one can make sense out of some kind of de re belief ascrip-
tion in his framework. My concern is that the beliefs that would be 
attributed by sentences containing vague terms would all be de re 
beliefs in this sense, if Fara is correct. This is enough to resurrect the 
worry, because, counter-intuitively, virtually any belief ascription 
would attribute a de re belief about a usually not explicitly men-
tioned salient agent. In sum, we can in fact resurrect a weak sense 
of de re belief on a coarse-grained view of content. It follows that 
we can still pose the objection that it threatens to make all empirical 
belief de re belief about persons, a consequence that remains worri-
some even in a weaker sense of de re belief.
Adoption of the framework of Russellian structured propositions 
considerably strengthens Fara’s position. Fara treats the element in 
the structure that depends on a contextually salient person as a high 
type operator expression. She assumes that this means that the epis-
temic requirements for grasp of its content are not as demanding 
as the ones involved in grasping the content of singular terms. Fara 
therefore assumes, in her response to the epistemic objection, that 
epistemic categories neatly correspond to grammatical ones. And 
she is absolutely right that this is a standard assumption of those who 
employ the apparatus of Russellian propositions. Responding to her 
argument therefore requires challenging the connection Russellians 
typically hold obtains between semantic categories and epistemologi-
cal ones. Challenging a basic assumption of a research program is dif-
ficult. In the end, it required a paper, Armstrong and Stanley 2011.
Using an acquaintance based epistemology as a model, Arm-
strong and Stanley 2011 places the Russellian assumption of a match 
between semantic and epistemic categories under pressure. Suppose 
one introduced an operator, ‘Johnly’, which meant the same as ‘Ac-
cording to John’. Intuitively one might think that linguistic compe-
tence with ‘Johnly’ requires acquaintance with John. But Fara could 
argue, via the same reasoning she employs above, that linguistic 
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competence with ‘Johnly’ does not require acquaintance with John, 
since an operator meaning is a kind of “high type function”, and not 
an object. Restricting acquaintance requirements to directly ref-
erential expressions allows too easy exploitation of the Russellian 
framework to evade epistemic commitments.
One example we use involves Montague’s theory of proper 
names. One could have good semantic reasons for treating proper 
names as denoting function from properties to truth-values.7 Sup-
pose one has good semantic reasons to treat proper names in this 
way. There is a perfectly natural way to retain the sense in which 
understanding a sentence containing a proper name involves having 
a singular thought about the bearer of that name, even if the propo-
sitional content of the sentence on that occasion does not contain it 
as a constituent. Linguistic competence with a proper name, such 
as ‘John’, consists, on this semantic theory, in the state of knowing 
that ‘John’ denotes a function from properties of John to true, and 
all other properties to false. Being in such a state involves having 
acquaintance with John (or whatever one’s favored model of singular 
thought involves). Nevertheless, the semantic values of proper names 
are still, on this view, higher-type operators.
Our second argument concerns the word ‘actually’, as it occurs 
in philosopher English. We argue that any plausible syntax and se-
mantics of philosopher English will treat ‘actually’ as having an op-
erator as its semantic value. We motivate the existence of powerful 
epistemic demands associated with grasping an occurrence of ‘ac-
tually’, specifically in the counterfactual case. If this is right, then 
the desired Russellian links between semantic categories and epis-
temic categories will fail. It will not be simple or straightforward to 
grasp operator meanings. Our discussion threatens the neat match 
between semantic categories and epistemic ones presupposed by 
standard Russellianism. It also threatens to undermine Fara’s novel 
strategy of concealing the subjective metaphysics of her view behind 
an imposing wall of type-theoretic semantic values.
7 On Montague’s theory, ‘Jason Stanley’ denotes a function from properties I 
have to the true, and properties I lack to the false.
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6 Fara vindicated?
Armstrong and Stanley (2011) argue that different semantic catego-
ries can correspond to the same epistemic category. For example, 
linguistic competence with a proper name requires acquaintance 
with a bearer, whether Kripke is right about the semantics of proper 
names or Montague. Whether ‘actually’ denotes a possible world or 
an operator, linguistic competence with ‘actually’ typically (invari-
ably?) requires having a thought about the actual world. The goal of 
Jeffrey C. King 2015 is to defend the standard Russellian assump-
tions against Armstrong and Stanley’s critique, by rejecting both 
these claims.8 If King is correct, it vindicates the central assumptions 
of Fara’s reply to the epistemic objection to her relativist view.
King first argues that one can grasp one of Montague’s semantic 
values for proper names without having acquaintance with the indi-
vidual who is the bearer of the name. The key premise of his argu-
ment is that “one can become acquainted with a function by being 
told enough about it by someone already acquainted with it.” Let’s 
say fj is Montague’s semantic value for the proper name, ‘John’, a 
function from properties to truth-values. According to King, we can 
grasp fj by being told “enough information about it” by someone ac-
quainted with it, e.g. about its values given arguments like being a 
philosopher. This is sufficient for acquaintance with it. If so, then one 
can be acquainted with the function fj without being acquainted with 
the person John. King concludes that if Montague is correct about 
the semantics of proper names, grasping the contents of sentences 
containing them does not require having singular thoughts.
According to King, one can grasp fj given only some of its values 
for some of its inputs, without having information that allows one 
to even come close to uniquely identifying fj. The under-determina-
tion is resolved by the fact that the person who informed you of the 
highly partial information about the function has acquaintance with 
it, which you can then inherit. King’s argument appeals crucially to 
deference. It is because I defer to a person who has acquaintance with 
8 The “standard Russellian account” of singular thought explains this epis-
temic category in terms of the metaphysical apparatus of structured propositions, 
understood in the sense of contemporary Russellian theorists of content.
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the function, that I also acquire acquaintance on the basis of non-
uniquely identifying information. 
With a capacious enough notion of deference, one can conclude 
that one can acquire acquaintance with fj  without acquiring acquain-
tance with John. King is right that the capacious notion of deference 
required for the argument is still not capacious enough to pass on the 
speaker’s acquaintance with John. After all, given only the informa-
tion provided in King’s example, for instance, one might become 
acquainted with fj, while falsely taking it to be the semantic value 
of the quantifier expression ‘someone’. In particular, King is clearly 
correct that a person in this situation lacks acquaintance with John.
And of course, King’s case does not rest simply on the single case 
of ‘someone’. His argument is that as long as proper names are given 
Montague semantic values, there will be cases in which one intui-
tively lacks acquaintance with the object. His argument goes through 
as long as there are cases in which one does not know if one is think-
ing about a quantifier semantic value associated with a general term, 
or the quantifier semantic value associated with a singular term, and 
nevertheless, via the route he describes has acquaintance with the 
semantic value of the singular term.
Here are two claims about proper names (here construed as in-
cluding all expressions certain theorists consider as “devices of di-
rect reference”). One is that grasp of the correct semantic value of 
a proper name N requires acquaintance with the bearer of N. The 
other is that, linguistic competence with a proper name N requires 
acquaintance with the bearer of N. The first is a claim just about 
the semantic values proper names have, and the second is a claim 
about proper names themselves. These claims are easy to conflate. 
In Armstrong and Stanley 2011, we endorsed both without noticing 
their differences. But they are distinct claims.
The direct reference theorist about names holds that the semantic 
value of any proper name is its bearer. If direct reference theory is 
true, the two claims do not diverge in truth-value. King’s argument 
shows however that these two claims can diverge in truth-value. 
Specifically, in the context of Montague’s semantic theory of proper 
names, the claims come apart. King’s argument is against the first 
of these claims. But it does not undermine the second claim, about 
linguistic competence. And if we restrict Armstrong and Stanley’s 
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point just to linguistic competence, it raises no less of a problem for 
the standard Russellian framework.
Linguistic competence with a proper name requires knowing that 
it is a proper name. This truism is embedded into theories that re-
flect proper name status in the distinctive semantic values that are 
assigned to them, as in the case of direct reference theory. In con-
trast, Montague semantics treats proper names as a subclass of gen-
eralized quantifier expressions. King’s argument trades on some of 
the unforeseen consequences of this assimilation.
If we think of Armstrong and Stanley’s arguments in terms of 
the notion of linguistic competence, King’s concerns do not arise. 
Understanding the name ‘John’ requires knowing that it’s a proper 
name. This means that if someone inherits the capacity to talk about 
John using the name ‘John’, they will not be confused about whether 
or not they are thinking about an individual or the quantifier mean-
ing of ‘someone’. They may not be able to distinguish John from 
Dean, but they will nevertheless be acquainted with John, in the ca-
pacious sense of acquaintance also at work in King’s arguments. This 
is enough to conclude that understanding certain utterances requires 
having singular thoughts, even though the sentences uttered do not express 
singular propositions. And that is enough to reject the standard Russel-
lian framework, which denies this possibility.
The stronger claim, the one explicitly targeted by King, is that 
grasping the Montagovian semantic value of a proper name requires 
acquaintance with its bearer. There is also a plausible defense of this 
claim against King’s argument. If someone does not know whether 
or not their thought concerns a specific individual, or the denotation 
of ‘someone’, then they are certainly not having a singular thought. 
But that may also be because they do not have a coherent thought at 
all in this situation. The key premise of King’s argument is that “one 
can become acquainted with a function by being told enough about 
it by someone already acquainted with it.” If one hasn’t been told 
“enough about” a function to know whether it’s about a specific indi-
vidual or just the quantifier denotation of ‘someone’, then one hasn’t 
been told enough about it to have a determinate thought about it all.
What about the more general case? If one hasn’t been told enough 
about the semantic value of a proper name such as ‘John’ to dis-
tinguish the thought one is having from the thought one would be 
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having with (for example) ‘many people’, or ‘all but three people’, 
it’s hard to imagine one is having a coherent thought at all. There is 
nothing specific in this response to the case of ‘someone’. Perhaps 
only acquaintance with John delivers acquaintance with that func-
tion from properties to truth-values that takes a property to the true 
if and only if John has it. If one falls short of this epistemic standard, 
it is arguably not clear one is grasping a specific thought at all. I am 
not seeing a route out of intuitional impasse in this case.
Let’s now turn to King’s second argument, concerning our dis-
cussion of ‘actually’ in the semantics of philosopher English. Recall 
the goal of Armstrong and Stanley 2011, to undermine the standard 
Russellian assumption that there is a correspondence between se-
mantic categories and epistemic ones. We wanted to argue that the 
semantic distinctions between for example operators and singular 
terms did not in and of themselves entail significant epistemic dif-
ferences. We used the term ‘actually’ to make this point. In King’s 
second argument, he turns to the topic of ‘actually’, seeking to show 
that instead of posing a problem for traditional Russellian assump-
tions connecting semantic categories to epistemic ones, reflection 
upon it vindicates them. Indeed, King uses ‘actually’ to show that 
propositions containing operators can be grasped without any sin-
gular thought.
King seeks to show that grasp of a proposition containing the 
denotation of an occurrence of ‘actually’ does not place the kind of 
epistemic demands on an agent that are required to grasp proposi-
tions expressed by sentences containing singular terms. 9 Let us see 
if his argument establishes the required epistemic asymmetry be-
tween sentences containing operator expressions and sentences con-
taining singular terms.
9 There is much that is interesting, but not dialectically central in King’s re-
sponse. King spends many pages arguing that possible worlds are properties and 
not objects, according to the theorists we criticize. But this is irrelevant. Even if 
possible worlds are properties, the semantic content of an occurrence of ‘actu-
ally’ is not simply a possible world, but some more complex model theoretic type. 
The aim of Armstrong and Stanley 2011 is to show that the epistemic criteria that 
one must satisfy to grasp these more complex model theoretic types can be simi-
lar or even the same as those implicated in linguistic competence with predicates 
and singular terms.
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King takes the character of ‘actually’ to be a function from con-
texts to a function from worlds to a function from intensions to 
truth-values. Given the inputs of a context c and a context world 
@, its content is a function such that for any proposition intension 
(function from worlds to truth-values) I, Ac@(I) = T iff I(@) = T. 
King writes:
Now consider a particular proposition of this form <Ac@, P>, for 
some proposition P that I grasp. Does grasp of this proposition consti-
tute having a singular thought about @? It seems not. For here is how 
I grasp this proposition without having a singular thought about @. I 
imagine a function that when applied to any world w, yields a function 
that maps proposition intensions that are true (not true at w; true!) 
to true and the others to false. This is just the function Ac@. So far 
I haven’t had a singular thought about @. But surely having imagined 
this function in this way, I am now in a position to grasp propositions 
that have it as a constituent. I told you what the function was after all! 
But this means I am in a position to grasp <Ac@, P>, since I grasp P. 
So, I can grasp <Ac@, P> without thereby having a singular thought 
about @. Hence <Ac@, P> is not a singular thought.
King here argues that if one occupies world @, there is a way of 
grasping <Ac@, P>, without having a singular thoughtp about @. 
Grasping the character of ‘Actually’, and occupying the context in 
which it is evaluated allows one to formulate a description of the con-
tent of ‘actually’ in this context. King presents this as a method by 
which one can grasp <Ac@, P>, without relying on one’s acquain-
tance with @ (although he concedes, in a footnote, that one is in this 
case acquainted with @).
Obviously, King’s point does not address the epistemic require-
ments for counterfactual knowledge of actuality. The procedure he 
describes is hopeless in this case, as it would invariably lead to a 
thought about the world in which one occupies. A richer epistemol-
ogy is required. But if counterfactual knowledge of actuality requires 
acquaintance with the actual world, that is enough to establish Arm-
strong and Stanley’s point about ‘actually’. So King’s argument is in 
fact irrelevant to the Armstrong and Stanley claim that grasp of the 
content of certain operators requires acquaintance with the world 
states. The account King gives does not generalize to counterfactual 
knowledge of actuality, and for all he says counterfactual knowledge 
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of actuality does involve acquaintance with the actual world state. 
King provides no method or account of counterfactual knowledge of 
actuality, and so strictly speaking there is no need to even address his 
discussion to defend Armstrong and Stanley (2011).
More generally, it is prima facie odd to give an account of acquain-
tance that is restricted to actual knowledge of actuality, i.e. the con-
ditions under which actual world agents grasp the semantic content 
of an occurrence of ‘actually’ or ‘actual’. All the arguments that cen-
ter on the difficulty of grasping actuality operators involve the dif-
ficulty of counterfactual knowledge of actuality, not actual knowledge 
of actuality.10 So even if King’s argument were to be successful, its 
philosophical utility is at best marginal. Nevertheless, since I found 
myself unconvinced by his account of actual knowledge of actuality, 
it is worth discussing.
King writes, “imagine a function that when applied to any world 
w, yields a function that maps proposition intensions that are true 
(not true at w; true!) to true and the others to false.” He argues this is 
enough to grasp, in the actual world, the content of ‘actually’ relative 
to that world. The obvious response is that it is not enough, that one 
needs to imagine a function that is associated with truth-values in 
the actual world. King addresses this response in a footnote, where 
he writes:
Is thinking about true proposition intensions having a singular thought 
about [the actual world state]? I don’t see why it would be unless you 
thought that being true was being true [at the actual world state]. But 
nobody should think that. That grass is green is true is contingent, but 
that grass is green is true [at the actual world state] is not.
10 Consider, for example, Timothy Williamson’s response to one of Dorothy 
Edgington’s accounts of Fitch’s knowability paradox (Edgington 1985). Edging-
ton rightly points out that the paradox can be blocked if we formulate the know-
ability principle with actuality operators. Williamson (1987) replies by arguing 
that counterfactual knowledge of actuality is a very demanding or perhaps impos-
sible condition to meet (absent a complete descriptive specification of another 
world state), and so the resulting knowability principle should be rejected on 
independent grounds. Soames (2002) also uses the difficulty of counterfactual 
knowledge of actuality against actualized description theories of proper names. 
The philosophical puzzles here entirely pertain to counterfactual knowledge 
about the actual world. It is mysterious why one would care about producing an 
account that only addresses actual knowledge of the actual world.
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Armstrong and Stanley (2011) argue that there are properties, 
and even higher-typed functions such as operator meanings, that one 
can only think of if one has acquaintance with an object or property 
that is not this semantic value. Here, they would argue that thinking 
about true proposition intensions requires having acquaintance with 
the actual world-state. What they reject is that the only way to make 
sense of this is by identifying being true with being true at the actual 
world state. This just dismisses without argument the possibility of 
the logical, semantical, and epistemological space that Armstrong 
and Stanley argue to be perfectly coherent.
The argument begs the question in another way as well; it can 
be brought out by reflecting upon a precisely analogous method one 
might use to argue that one could have a first-personal thought per-
fectly generally. Consider the proposition I would express by, ‘I am 
a philosopher’. Consider the function that takes a context and yields 
the agent of that context. Suppose I am the agent of the context. Isn’t 
this a perfectly general way of coming to grasp the proposition that I 
am a philosopher? The agent of the context is a philosopher and I am 
the agent of the context.
One might deny this possibility, because one might reasonably 
deny that purely descriptive information is enough to yield grasp of 
<Jason, P>. In order to grasp <Jason, P>, one needs the additional 
information that the agent of the context is Jason.
If one is inclined to reply in this way, one should also deny that 
King’s original procedure is a possible route to grasping <Ac@, 
P>. The procedure he describes yields only descriptive knowledge of 
Ac@. One might think that to grasp <Ac@, P>, one needs the ad-
ditional cognitively significant information that the function that is 
the output of the character rule for ‘actually’ relative to the context 
world is Ac@. And this plausibly requires acquaintance with Ac@. 
Ac@ takes proposition intensions and yields True iff those proposi-
tion intensions are true in @. It is reasonable to take the additional 
information that allows one to grasp <Ac@, P> to be acquaintance 
with @. I do not see a persuasive disanalogy between the case of 
the philosopher’s ‘actual’ and the first person pronoun; if descriptive 
knowledge of the content of the former is possible, so is descriptive 
knowledge of the content of the latter. But the latter is perhaps the 
paradigm Russellian singular term.
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7 Relativism and modality
A fully general relativist metaphysics such as Fara’s faces an epistemic 
objection that more limited versions of relativism, such as episte-
mological relativism, do not. One might think that a parallel moral 
will emerge from consideration of modal dependence. A general, 
broad sweeping metaphysical interest-relativity will, at least prima 
facie, run a far greater risk of misclassifying facts as metaphysically 
dependent on interests and persons. And one might think that here 
too a more limited relativist claim for the epistemic domain will 
avoid problematic predictions of unintuitive modal dependencies. It 
is much more surprising to be told that whether or not that mountain 
is large depends metaphysically upon unmentioned persons, than it is 
to be told that whether or not Hannah knows something depends on 
the existence of Hannah.
Thanks mainly to Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009), it has emerged 
in the literature, that counter-intuitive modal objections will arise 
for any hermeneutical interest-relative view of any interest. This is, 
in retrospect, unsurprising. Interest-relative views of the sort I have 
been discussing postulate non-obvious relativity to human interests 
in our ordinary thought about a domain. Modal objections arise to 
interest-relative views of this sort as a means to test the dependency 
claims to which such views are committed. The objector rejects the 
interest-relativity claim of the given domain, because it is inconsis-
tent with our intuitions about counterfactuals that connect changes 
in interests to changes in facts about that domain. The problem fac-
ing Fara is more general. How does she reply?
Her main response to worries about individual judgments is to 
complicate her semantic theory. But the virtue of her version of rela-
tivism is that it is genuine relativism, in Boghossian’s sense, factual 
relativism, rather than “new age relativism”, which is semantic. The 
more weight one places on special semantic explanations, the more 
it seems that Fara’s relativism is semantic after all. Fara response un-
dermines one of the motivations to accept her view, that it is factual 
relativism.
Fara’s general metaphysical view elicits a certain surprise, 
what, following David Lewis, is called the “incredulous stare”. 
But Fara rejects the demand to address this; it is, according to her, 
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question-begging. Yet it’s hard to see this response as true to the 
spirit of Fara’s original view either. 
Recall the modal objection specifically to Fara is that her theory 
predicts an incorrect modal profile for ordinary sentences like ‘This 
is a heap’, one that makes its truth dependent upon the existence of 
interests. But it seems that even if there were no people, this would 
still be a heap. Fara’s basic strategy is to block arguments from coun-
terfactuals of the form ‘if p were the case then q’ to the content of 
stand-alone occurrence of q. She provides an account of the coun-
terfactual that putatively accounts for the truth of ‘if there were no 
people, this would still be a heap’, without it compromising her in-
terest-relative metaphysics for the proposition that this is still a heap.
Fara’s thought is that in counterfactual evaluation, we often keep 
the interests fixed. We rigidify on the interests in some (albeit mys-
terious) manner, and then evaluate the consequent of the counter-
factual, even with respect to worlds at which those interests do not 
exist. As she writes, “the evaluation of counterfactuals often involves 
holding certain facts fixed, even when those facts would not have ob-
tained had the antecedent of the conditional been true.”
Fara provides some interesting data supporting her claim, such as 
the following kind of case:
(5) If no people had ever existed, it would be very surprising for 
this cave wall to be so smooth.
I do not understand how the proposed rigidification on interests 
is supposed work. But I have a considerably more foundational con-
cern. However the rigidification mechanism works, it must be as-
sociated with interest-relative words such as ‘surprising’. But this 
suggests that her metaphysical relativism is accompanied by modifi-
cations to the semantic theory to accommodate it.
A central motivation for interest-relativity, present both in the 
literature in epistemology and in Fara’s work on vagueness, is that 
it evades the semantic commitments of contextualist and truth-rel-
ativist views about the domain. It is not, as Boghossian would say, 
“new age” relativism, that is, semantic relativism. It is rather factual 
relativism, relativism about the subject matter. But the view that 
there is a special mechanism that rigidifies interests and allows them 
to be relevant for the truth-conditions of modal claims (even those 
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involving worlds in which the interests do not exist) relinquishes 
just this very motivation from the view. The motivation for factual 
relativism is that there is no special semantics for interest-relativity. 
Interest-relativity is a metaphysical hypothesis about certain proper-
ties and relations, rather than a semantic hypothesis, as contextual-
ism and “new age” relativism are. But if we require special treatment 
of expressions that express interest-relative properties when they are 
embedded in counterfactuals, the view begins to look like it too in-
volves special semantic commitments. Furthermore, these commit-
ments more exotic than the ones incurred by other semantic theses, 
such as contextualism or truth-relativism.
I am open to the possibility that there is a non-standard seman-
tics that will enable Fara to retain the interest-relative interpretation 
of ‘that mountain is tall’, according to which the proposition it ex-
presses could only be true in worlds with interests, and yet validate 
counterfactuals such as:
(6) If no people had ever existed, that mountain would still be tall.
I just remain unclear exactly how it would work. There are no 
interests in a world with no people. So if we somehow rigidified on 
the interest-sensitive component of the predicate ‘tall’, it is not clear 
how to use this-worldy interest about mountains in a possible situ-
ation without them. I would like to briefly explore another line of 
inquiry inspired by her suggestion about the counterfactual.
Fara’s thought is that perhaps interests interact with the interpre-
tation of counterfactuals so that counterfactual interpretation does 
not track the modal profile of the ordinary embedded sentences. She 
chooses to realize this strategy by altering the semantics of terms 
with interest-relative semantic contents. But prima facie one can 
accomplish this in a way that does not affect the interpretation of 
expressions with interest-dependent contents, but just the counter-
factual operator itself.
Let’s suppose that interests were something that were kept fix 
in counterfactual evaluation. I am here not thinking of the more ba-
roque proposal that some expression inside the scope of the coun-
terfactual is subject to a rigidifying operation. I am rather think-
ing of a proposal according to which the similarity relation for the 
counterfactual may only connect to worlds in which, where possible, 
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the interests of relevant parties were the same. For obvious reasons, 
Fara does not suggest this simpler option; the counterfactuals that 
pose problems for her view involve the consideration of worlds with 
no interests. But there are no correspondingly problematic counter-
factuals for the interest-relative about knowledge. So it is an option 
worth exploring in this case.
Let’s see how this suggestion would help with the modal pro-
file objection facing interest-relativism about knowledge. Suppose 
that Hannah is in a low stakes bank case — nothing much hangs on 
whether or not the bank is open. She has some evidence that the bank 
is open, sufficient in the situation to know that the bank is open. If 
however Hannah had a check coming due, then she would be in a 
high stakes case. The following counterfactual seems false:
(7) If Hannah had had a check coming through, then she wouldn’t 
know that the bank is open.
On the face of it, the interest-relativity of knowledge predicts 
that (7) is true. If these judgments about such counterfactuals are 
robust, then our counterfactual judgments do not pick up on the 
interest-relative metaphysics postulated by the thesis of interest-rel-
ativity of knowledge.
For the sake of simplicity, let’s consider a Stalnaker selection 
function semantics for counterfactuals. The proposal I just suggest-
ed, inspired by Fara’s 2008 strategy (but distinct from her imple-
mentation of it), is to have the selection function take the antecedent 
world, and yield a consequent world in which Hannah’s interests are 
the same. In other words, counterfactual evaluation would not shift 
interests of relevant parties. Cases such as (7) involve counterfactu-
als the antecedents of which are attempts to shift interests. But given 
the stipulation about the selection function, it would fail to do so. 
Judgments about (7) would be judgments about possible situations in 
which Hannah had a check coming, but it didn’t affect her practical 
interests. The proposed meta-semantic claim (the proposed hypoth-
esis about the choice of selection function) would render the correct 
intuitive judgment in cases such as (7), namely it would be false. As 
in the case of Fara’s proposed strategy, it would not follow that the 
proposition that is in the consequent of the counterfactual lacks an 
interest-relative metaphysics.
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However, there are counterfactuals that do explicitly involve the 
changing of interests, as in:
(8) If I wasn’t interested in going to the park, I would have told 
you so.
And of course we need a selection function that selects antecedent 
worlds with different interests to generate the right results here. So 
the suggestion could not be that no selection function is responsive 
to changes in interests. There would have to be some special plead-
ing for a non-standard selection function for examples such as (7), 
and that would have to be motivated.
More problematically, no solution to the modal problems plagu-
ing interest-relative views that locates its source in the interpretation 
of the counterfactual conditional can be correct. This is because the 
problems arise not just with modals, but also with temporal expres-
sions. Stanley (2005: 106) gives the following example:
…suppose that on Thursday, Hannah had a bill coming due over the 
weekend. So, on  Thursday, she did not know that the bank would be 
open on Saturday. But suppose that, on Friday, the company to whom 
the bill was owed decided to alleviate the debt of all of its customers. 
So, on Thursday, Hannah was in a high stakes situation, whereas on 
Friday, she was not. Then it would seem that IRI entails the truth of:
(2) Hannah didn’t know on Thursday that the bank would be open 
on Saturday, but she did know on Friday.
No solution specific to the counterfactual construction can help 
here. Nor is it clear that even temporal rigidification on ‘know’ 
would help, because it is not clear what interests on which one should 
rigidify, the interests on Thursday or the interests on Friday.11
I am dubious that there is a semantic solution to these problems. 
More generally, by seeking a special semantic explanation, Fara blurs 
the important distinction between factual relativism and semantic 
relativism. Fara regards it as an advantage of her view that it is a 
direct response to the data, reflecting our judgments in the meta-
physics, and is therefore to be preferred to semantic accounts such as 
11 Of course, if one rigidified on the speaker’s interests, that is, the interests 
of the knowledge attributors, the view would, again, collapse into contextualism.
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contextualism or what Crispin Wright calls “new wave” relativism. 
But the fact that she must employ a non-standard semantics to evade 
problems undermines this virtue of her theory.
Fara (2008) concludes by repudiating a more direct, non-modal 
version of the objection to her interest-relative metaphysics. The ob-
jection she considers is just an incredulous stare at the view that or-
dinary propositions, such as the proposition that Mt. Everest is tall, 
can only be true in worlds with interests. This objection is just a way 
of making public one’s commitment to the subject-independence of 
ordinary propositions, a way of making public a commitment to a 
form of metaphysical realism that Fara’s theory explicitly repudiates. 
Fara rejects the demand to address this worry, which she describes 
as a “flat-out denial” of her view.
Yet it is difficult to see how Fara is entitled to respond in this way 
to the incredulous stare. Recall that Fara’s view is introduced as a re-
sponse to an incredulous stare — to the falsity of the Sorites Prem-
ise. Her view emerges precisely as an answer to the “psychological 
question” of why, if the Sorites Premise is false, are we so strongly 
inclined to believe it to be true? A similar psychological question 
arises about the metaphysical consequences of her view. If facts about 
mountains are dependent on interests and people, why are we so 
inclined to believe otherwise? She is scarcely in a position to deny 
the need to address this question; it is a version of the psychological 
question, just one level of analysis down.
And here is where the more limited factual relativism about the 
epistemic has a great advantage over Fara’s more general factual rela-
tivism. The psychological question that arises for my view is the fol-
lowing: if epistemic facts are dependent on interests, why are we 
so inclined to think otherwise? The source of the intuition here is 
adherence to epistemic purity. And advocates of epistemic relativity 
in the sense of KPI are far from the first to express skepticism about 
epistemic purity.
In the first section of Railton 1991, a section called, “On the Ide-
ological Character of Belief in the Objectivity of Science”, Railton 
(1991) argues that the thought that objectivity and knowledge are val-
ue-free operates ideologically. Value-free conceptions of knowledge 
or objectivity are ideological because they prevent one from recog-
nizing that one’s own perspective lacks special value-free authority. 
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We are motivated by self-interest to regard our own inquiry, as op-
posed to the inquiry of others, value-free. This gives our inquiries, 
and our judgments, the special authority of neutrality, which seems 
to us the authority of knowledge.12 This manifests in ground level 
beliefs that knowledge is not dependent on interests, beliefs that are 
reflected in our rejection of certain counterfactuals. But the general 
underlying belief in purity that explains them is no more plausible in 
the knowledge case than in the objectivity case.
Louise Antony (2006) describes “Dragnet objectivity” as the 
view that a “good investigator will…discipline herself to consider 
just the facts — the raw, undisputed, facts of the matter, unadorned 
by personal speculation and uncorrupted by emotional interest in the 
case.” She argues that dragnet objectivity will lead to less knowledge 
rather than more, and so is a bad epistemic ideal for limited human 
agents; this is also the motivation of KPI. But Antony also argues 
that dragnet objectivity also has an ideological function. Specifically, 
dragnet objectivity is a useful tool for elites to employ to gain a puta-
tive epistemic advantage; “…the promulgation of dragnet objectivity 
functions ideologically to safeguard and reinforce the political status 
quo.” Antony’s “dragnet objectivity” is nothing other than epistemic 
purity.
In Stanley 2015: Chapter 6, I argue that in many cases of demo-
cratic deliberation between those with more advantages and those 
with less, the dependence of knowledge on interests will result in an 
epistemic advantage for those better off. If the epistemic advantage is 
seen as due to material advantage or other kinds of social privilege, 
it will be recognized as less authoritative. The only ideology I need 
to appeal to in order to do the explanatory work of explaining the 
sense of lack of metaphysical dependence on interests is the ideology 
of privilege.
What about those who are the victims of the sort of epistemic 
injustice discussed in Stanley 2015: Chapter 6? I maintain that they 
will in fact recognize that the knowledge wielded by elites is often 
12 Carl Schmitt (1996: 35) writes: “As with every political concept, the neu-
trality concept too is subject to the ultimate presupposition of a real possibility 
of a friend and enemy grouping. Should only neutrality prevail in the world, then 
not only war but also neutrality would come to an end.”
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dependent on differentials in resources and power. They will see 
elites absorbing the same news channels and they do, and act with 
greater epistemic authority. On my view, knowledge is constitutive-
ly connected to action, and elites will have less constraints on their 
actions because they will have more power. I maintain that this de-
pendence of knowledge on power and interests will be clear to those 
who suffer from disparities in power and resources, provided they 
have achieved some measure of critical consciousness.
In short, I find plausible the classic critical theory explanation for 
our tendency to recoil from the metaphysical dependence of knowl-
edge on interests. It is often in the interests of elites to do so, and 
they are engaged in wishful thinking. I think that those subject to 
this kind of epistemic oppression will be much more likely to recog-
nize it. So we have an explanation ready to hand in terms of ideol-
ogy and wishful thinking to explain why we fail to see dependence 
of knowledge on interests. I do not see a similar explanation in terms 
of ideology and self-interest that would explain our failure to rec-
ognize the metaphysical dependence of all ordinary empirical facts 
upon interests.
There is a prima facie tension between objectivity and genuine 
relativism. I have argued that my favored relativist view evades these 
worries. While it involves some surprising metaphysical claims, the 
view straightforwardly also predicts a pattern of resistance to these 
claims. The hypothesis that I am suggesting is that the first order 
modal judgments about modal dependencies of knowledge on inter-
ests that are the basis of most philosophers’ rejection of this version 
of epistemic relativism is a manifestation of this pattern of resistance.
8 Conclusion
I began this paper with Paul Boghossian’s distinction between fac-
tual relativism and semantic relativism. One moral of the discus-
sion of Fara is that, as factual relativism becomes more general, the 
distinction between the two begins to blur. The reason is that any 
interesting factually relativist thesis will have consequences that are 
sufficiently upsetting that they will have to be masked. As we have 
seen in detail in the case of Fara, if the relativism is general enough, 
the masking will employ the tools and resources of semantics. This 
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invariably blurs the lines between factual and semantic versions of 
relativism.
The central concern facing any factually relativist claim is that it 
will compromise some important forms of objectivity. I have tried to 
illustrate this point with the use of Fara’s very general form of rela-
tivism. The relativist view I hold involves just the epistemic domain: 
epistemic facts are relative to interests. I have argued that this is a 
version of epistemic relativism that is both genuinely relativist and 
consistent with all plausible versions of objectivity. Of course, it is 
not consistent with the view that there is a realm of pure epistemic 
fact, free of practical dimensions. I have argued that our inclination 
towards this position is ideological. There is no reason to take pur-
ism about epistemology as the default view. None of our most central 
concepts of objectivity require it.13
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